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BOOK REVIEWS
The Moral Mystic, by James R. Home. (SR Supplements, 14.) Waterloo,
Ontario: Wilfred Laurier University Press, 1983. Pp. x + 132. $7.50.

Reviewed by WILLIAM J. WAINWRIGHT, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee.
Home distinguishes "pure mysticism" from "mixed mysticism," and argues
that while the former is amoral, the latter is sometimes moral. Home has a
number of interesting things to say, but the way in which he draws his distinction
between the two types of mysticism and his characterization of morality are both
questionable.
While the pure mystic is sometimes identified with the introvertive or monistic
mystic who cultivates a state of empty consciousness, the general thrust of
Home's discussion suggests that pure mysticism is not to be identified with a
distinctive experience but with an attitude towards it. Pure mystics, according
to Home, deliberately cultivate their state of empty consciousness and "tend to
dismiss religious and other doctrines as irrelevant to their mystical way." (58)
Because they focus on the experience itself to the exclusion of other (intellectual
and practical) concerns, pure mystics are amoral. The mixed mystic places his
experience in a larger context, and integrates his quest for illumination with
other concerns. When these concerns include moral concerns, the mixed mystic
will be a "moral mystic."
There are varieties of mixed mysticism. In characterizing these varieties, Home
assimilates Stace's distinction between pantheism, monism and dualism, and
Zaehner's distinction between nature mysticism, monism and theism, and argues
that the three should be regarded as "interpretations of illumination." The first
emphasizes "that the experience is of consciousness alone, emptied of its contents," and interprets illumination as an experience "of nothing" ("all nature
unified, nothing in particular"). The second emphasizes "that it is after all an
experience, and that it is the individual mystic's own experience," and interprets
"it in terms of selfhood." The third emphasizes that an "experience is always of
something" and that any relation can be experienced in either an I-it mode or
an I-Thou mode, and interprets illumination as a meeting with an eternal Thou
who is "equally present" in encounters with human beings. (62-3) Only the last
interpretation of illumination is likely to express itself in a pattern of life which
does justice to moral concerns.
In my opinion, Home's typology is very problematic. (1) Home's characterization of pure mysticism conflates things which ought to be distinguished, viz.,
a deliberate cultivation of the state of empty consciousness and a self-centered
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preoccupation with one's own experiences which is uninterested in their intellectual and moral ramifications. Shankara is a pure mystic in the first sense but not
in the second. Indeed a positive evaluation of pure mysticism in the second sense
would appear to be a largely modem (and western?) phenomenon. (Christian
and Buddhist literature, for example, consistently admonishes us to remember
that what is important is not experiences but union with God or entry into
Nirvana.) (2) Nature mysticism ought not to be identified with, or assimilated
to, empty consciousness, for the former has natural objects as its contents (even
though they are perceived in an extraordinary new way) while the latter is devoid
of content. (3) Stace may be talking about three different interpretations of what
he regards as a single experience, but Zaehner is clearly talking of three different
experiences. (4) Finally Home often speaks as if there were a single experience
underlying the various types of mysticism. (Even though this experience will be
variously colored by the mystic's attitude towards it and the pattern of his life
as a whole.) I am not sure that Home means to assert this, but if he does he is
surely aware that this is a highly controversial thesis.
The root of these problems lies in the fact that Home attempts to combine
three different sorts of typology, viz., a typology of experiences, a typology of
interpretations, and a typology of (mystical) styles of life. The three typologies
are indeed related but they ought to be distinguished. (The experience of the
nature mystic can be interpreted theistically. Theistic mystics can become preoccupied with their experiences. And so on.)
Home distinguishes between "proper-name morality" in which the agent
embraces an ideal or cause or command or value as his special "calling" or
"destiny", and "social morality" which sympathetically responds to the needs
and concerns of others. Home maintains that "distance" -by which he means
moral uncertainty and doubt, a sense of the ambiguity of moral life, and a
sympathetic response to the ultimately irreconcilable diversity of needs and points
of view-is an essential feature of the latter.
It is not clear to me that moral doubt or uncertainty is an essential feature of
morality. I am prepared to concede that it would be essential if the needs,
concerns and yearnings to which social morality sympathetically responds are
irreconcilable, but the latter is (as MacIntyre, Sandel and others have pointed
out) a highly controversial presupposition of modem "liberal ideology." It is not
clear that it is a presupposition of morality itself. It should also be noted that
moral doubt can take two quite different forms. One may doubt one's own ability
to meet standards which one regards as compelling or doubt the quality of one's
own moral achievements, or one may be doubtful as to which standards follow.
Home tends to conflate the two and to emphasize the latter. But while the former
is typical of (at least) theistic mystics, the latter, it seems to me, is not. That
we find the second sort of doubt in modem mystics like Underhill and Merton
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is largely irrelevant, for they are products of a liberal culture which emphasizes
precisely this sort of ambiguity. In short, if "distance" in the latter sense is
essential to morality, then it would seem to me that (until quite recently) very
few of those mystics who have interpreted their experiences in I-Thou categories
have been moral-a conclusion which I find hard to accept.
It would be unfair to conclude on a negative note. The issues which Home
raises are important, and a number of his observations and distinctions are
suggestive. In particular, serious consideration should be given to his central
thesis, viz., that while mysticism can enhance morality by providing it with
depth and motivation, the sources of moral life are largely non-mystical, and
that mysticism by itself is insufficient to support morality. I suspect that this
may be true. In any case it deserves our attention.

Epistemology: The Justification o/Belie/, by David L. Wolfe, InterVarsity Press,
1983, pp. 92. $3.95.

Reviewed by JAMES A. KELLER, Wofford College.
This book is in the Contours o/Christian Philosophy series of "short introductory-level textbooks in the various fields of philosophy." Its style should be of
great help in communicating with beginning-level students, for it is simply and
clearly written and employs well chosen examples to clarify difficult points.
Moreover, the author makes a serious effort to grasp the attention and interest
of the intended readers by focusing on an issue about which college undergraduates might have doubts and on which techniques for assessing beliefs might
be welcomed. Thus there is no consideration of Gettier-type problems, and one
hears nothing of bam-facades or of grebes. Nor does one find the problem of
proving that an external world exists, only its notation as a problem which did
not arouse the interest of undergraduates (p. 14). Instead. the primary focus is
on religious and metaphysical beliefs (p. 18), which also provide the most
common source of illustrations. Nevertheless, the argument and conclusions
would be applicable to issues other than these, though more copious use of other
issues as illustrations might help drive home this point with beginning undergraduates.
Although, as Wolfe notes, epistemology traditionally was defined as "the
study of the possibility and nature of knowledge" (p. 14), the book is not
concerned with knowledge but with justified belief, or more precisely with what
is involved in showing that a belief is justified or "to put it somewhat differently"
that our assertions are warranted (p. 15). He promises to return later to the

